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GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE MILITARY: A
RATIONALLY BASED SOLUTION TO A LEGAL
RUBIK'S CUBE
David A. Schlueter*
Professor Schlueter writes about the policy of limited accommodation
adopted by Congress in response to the issue of military service of homo-
sexuals. He begins by delineating various options open to Congress, from
the extremes of a total ban to full accommodation, and then explains
the compromise solution of limited accommodation. Next, the role of
military law is considered in terms of its constitutional basis, with a
particular focus on military administrative law and criminal law issues.
After this discussion, the application of several provisions of the Bill of
Rights to servicemembers is highlighted. With this background estab-
lished, Professor Schlueter raises many potential constitutional, admin-
istrative, and criminal law issues Congress faced in dealing with
homosexuals in the military and concludes that, on balance, Congress'
solution marks a sensible compromise among several competing
interests.
INTRODUCTION
Few constitutional issues have sparked as much debate recently as
has the question of extending civil rights to gay men and lesbians. The
debate has been particularly sharp in the context of the military's "gay
ban" which limits the ability of homosexuals to serve in the armed forces.
The proponents of a ban on the service of homosexuals generally rest
their arguments on the assumption that those having a propensity to en-
gage in homosexual acts pose an unacceptable risk to military discipline
and performance. 1 Those opposing a ban argue that, as a recognized mi-
nority, homosexuals are entitled to a full measure of civil rights, including
the privilege of serving in the armed forces without any limitation.2
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. J.D. 1971, Baylor University
School of Law, LL.M. 1981, University of Virginia School of Law. This article is a revised
and expanded version of the author's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee, as noted in S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 269 (1993), and the House Subcom-
mittee on Military Forces and Personnel, Assessment of the Plan to Lift the Ban on
Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings Before the Military Forces and Personnel Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 224 (1993).
1. This "propensity" argument was advanced by the Secretary of Defense, and specifi-
cally rejected by the court in Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, and
reh'g granted, 8 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Steffan is discussed infra notes 24-28 and accom-
panying text.
2. The status of homosexuals as a "recognized minority" is unsettled. The Steffan
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The current debate is well-documented. On January 29, 1993, Presi-
dent Clinton fulfilled a campaign promise and directed a review of the
Department of Defense's long-standing policies3 concerning the service of
homosexuals in the armed forces.4 The Senate Armed Services Committee
responded by holding extensive hearings on the issue5 and, on July 19,
1993, received the Department of Defense's recommended changes in the
policy.6 Following additional hearings before both the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees, Congress adopted a statutory policy for
homosexuals serving in the military.1 The statute, which is included as an
Appendix to this article, in conjunction with Department of Defense im-
plementing regulations,8 has been dubbed the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,
Don't Pursue" policy.9 In December 1993, the Department of Defense re-
leased its implementing directives, 10 effective February 5, 1994, and in
March 1994 issued amendments to those directives."
During congressional consideration of the issue in 1993, it became
apparent that, if the ban were completely lifted, a host of legal and ad-
ministrative issues would arise. For example, could a homosexual ser-
vicemember claim a homosexual companion as a dependent?12 Could the
military limit or restrict a homosexual servicemember's access to a partic-
court declined to reach the issue of whether homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-
suspect class, instead holding that the then existing ban was based on status and failed the
rational basis constitutional analysis. Id. at 63.
3. A concise history of the military positions on homosexuality is included in S. REP.
No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 265-67 (1993).
4. President's Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense on Ending Discrimination
on the Basis of Sexual Orientation in the Armed Forces, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 112
(Jan. 29, 1993).
5. See S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 268-70 (1993).
6. Memorandum from Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy and Air Force and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (July 19, 1993) (on file with the
author).
7. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654 (West Supp. 1994).
8. For a discussion of Department of Defense Directives relating to homosexual service
in the armed forces are discussed, see infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
9. The statute includes a "don't tell" provision which prohibits servicemembers from
serving who have admitted that they are homosexuals or bisexuals. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(b)(2)
(West Supp. 1994). The "don't ask" and "don't pursue" components are found in the appli-
cable Department of Defense regulations. The first component restricts the ability of mili-
tary authorities to ask a recruit, or servicemember, to reveal his or her sexual orientation or
whether they have engaged in homosexual conduct. Department of Defense Directive
1304.26, para. B-8(a), at 2-5 (1994) (Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment,
and Induction), in Memorandum from Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to Secretaries of the
Military Departments et al. (Dec. 21, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum
from Les Aspin]. For a discussion of the second component, limiting the ability of the mili-
tary to investigate alleged homosexual conduct, see infra notes 236-45 and accompanying
text.
10. Memorandum from Les Aspin, supra note 9.
11. Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick, General Counsel of Department of Defense,
to Director of Administration and Management (Feb. 28, 1994) (on file with the author).
12. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra note 189 and accompanying
text.
MILITARY POLICY
ular assignment or location, or the ability to form support groups or clubs
on military installations? The legal and moral issues surrounding the de-
bate presented what amounted to a "legal Rubik's Cube."' 3 While many
of the hypothetical issues have been mooted by Congressional action
spelling out what amounts to a policy of limited accommodation, the de-
bate is certain to move into the federal courts for legal challenges. As this
article goes to press, several groups have filed suit challenging the consti-
tutionality of the new policy in the federal courts.
14
In order to determine the constitutionality of the new statute, federal
courts will have to decide, generally, whether Congress has the authority
to enact legislation concerning homosexual service and, if so, particularly,
whether this statute survives judicial scrutiny. In the process, those who
advocate a complete lifting of the ban will argue that doing so would not
pose any real threat to military discipline.
The following topics are discussed in this article with respect to the
new policy of limited accommodation for homosexuals: the role of law in
the military setting, taking into account the special needs of the military;
military administrative law and military criminal law; the application of
the Bill of Rights to servicemembers; and an assessment of the legal is-
sues likely to be created by the statutory and regulatory changes to the
military's position on the service of homosexuals in the armed forces.' 5
II. THE ROUTE OF LIMITED ACCOMMODATION: PROHIBITING CONDUCT BUT
NOT STATUS
A. In General: Congressional Options
In considering the issue of gays in the military, Congress ultimately
faced the task of line-drawing and choosing from a number of legislative
options. In determining whether the current policy is reasonable, the fed-
eral courts should take note of those options.
First, Congress could have continued the policy extant prior to the
President's actions in January 1993, through legislative enactment.
That policy precluded homosexuals from serving.
Second, the interim policy, as announced by President Clinton on
July 19, 1993, could have been codified by congressional action. That is,
13. See The Historical and Legal Background of the Ban on Homosexuals in the Mil-
itary: Hearings on S.919 Before the Senate Armed Services Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), reprinted in THE FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, March 29, 1993, at 2 (statement of David
A. Schlueter, Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law). The author used the
term "legal Rubik's Cube" to describe "a complicated set of interlocking constitutional and
military law issues and competing interests." Id.
14. See Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy is Challenged, N.Y. TIutEs, March 8, 1994, at
A18.
15. See also the author's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, as
noted in S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 269 (1993), and the House Subcommittee on
Military Forces and Personnel, Assessment of the Plan to Lift the Ban on Homosexuals in
the Military: Hearings Before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcomm. of the Comm.
on Armed Services, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 224 (1993).
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no questions would be asked about a person's sexual preference before
entry into the armed forces, but homosexual conduct would remain a
punishable offense or service disqualifying.
Third, the policy (or statute) could have provided that homosexu-
als be admitted without being asked to state their sexual preference,
but they would be prohibited from engaging in homosexual conduct
which is "service connected." An example of service-connected conduct
would be conduct occurring on a military installation or property, or
conduct between servicemembers at an off-post location."6
Fourth, Congress could have decided to treat homosexuals as a pro-
tected class and admitted them into the armed forces on equal footing
with all other heterosexual servicemembers without regard to sexual
conduct. In this scenario, homosexual conduct would not be punished.
While this list of options is not exhaustive, it provides a frame of
reference for understanding that, in the difficult task of line-drawing,
Congress understood that there would be inevitable legal issues associated
with each option. Of the options listed above, the first and the last op-
tions seem to be the easiest to apply because they are bright-line rules:
either homosexuals would not be admitted at all, or they would be admit-
ted as a protected class which would entitle them to all of the rights and
benefits available to heterosexual servicemembers. Inevitably, if one of
the bright-lines were to be adopted, those supporting the opposing bright-
line position would mount a legal challenge.
B. Congressional Action: Adopting the Route of Compromise
The President's January 1993 interim policy took a middle ground by
permitting homosexuals to serve in the armed forces with the proviso that
they refrain from homosexual conduct.17 Ultimately, that was the option
selected by Congress."" While Congress' solution offers more protections
for homosexuals than many would have wanted, it falls far short of the
goals advocated by those who oppose the ban. In effect, it amounts to a
limited accommodation. Although the congressional reform signals a con-
tinuation of a long-standing position that homosexual conduct is incom-
patible with military service, it recognizes that homosexuals who do not
manifest their status may serve. It also reflects a sensible balance between
the government's interest in an effective military and the rights of all per-
sons, including homosexuals.' 9
16. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra notes 225-28 and accompany-
ing text.
17. In a news conference on the day he issued his memorandum to the Secretary of
Defense, President Clinton said that the question was "[s]hould someone be able to serve
their [sic] country in uniform if they say they are homosexuals, but they do nothing which
violates the code of conduct or undermines unit cohesion or morale, apart from that state-
ment?" The President's News Conference on Gays in the Military, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 109 (Jan. 29, 1993).
18. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(b) (West Supp. 1994).
19. See S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1993) (noting consideration of
needs of military and rights of all persons).
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The new policy makes a clear distinction between homosexual status
(orientation) and homosexual conduct.20 Sexual orientation, which is
more abstract,21 is not grounds for exclusion from the armed forces;
rather, conduct is grounds for exclusion.12 While that distinction is sure
to be challenged, it is a defensible position, amply supported by the legis-
lative history accompanying the statute.2 3 The challenge to that distinc-
tion was foreshadowed in Steffan v. Aspin.24 In that case, a Naval
Academy midshipman challenged the Department of Defense's former
policy of excluding homosexuals from the armed forces.2 5 The court con-
cluded that the policy could not survive constitutional scrutiny, even
under a rational basis review. A key element in the court's decision
rested on the view that the military had no basis for concluding that ho-
mosexual orientation demonstrated a propensity for homosexual conduct.
The court stated: "[a]ccordingly, we find that the Secretary's "propen-
sity" argument, which presumes that "desire" will lead to misconduct, is
illegitimate as a matter of law. It cannot provide a rational basis for the
DOD Directives. '27 While the court's opinion in Steffan has been vacated
and is currently being considered by the court en banc, it would be rea-
sonable to assume that challenges to the new statutory provision will take
a similar tack: Any stated basis for excluding homosexuals for engaging in
20. See Department of Defense Directive 1304.26, para. B-8(a), at 2-5 (1994) ("Sexual
orientation is considered a personal and private matter, and homosexual orientation is not a
bar to service entry or continued service unless manifested by homosexual conduct."), in
Memorandum from Les Aspin, supra note 9.
21. See, e.g., Department of Defense Directive 1332.30, para. C, at 1-2 (1994) (Separa-
tion of Regular Commissioned Officers for Cause), in Memorandum from Les Aspin, supra
note 9, which defines "sexual orientation" as an "abstract preference for persons of a partic-
ular sex, as distinct from a propensity or intent to engage in sexual acts." Id. at 1-1. The
directive also indicates that the term "propensity" means "more than an abstract preference
or desire to engage in homosexual acts; it indicates a likelihood that a person engages in or
will engage in homosexual acts." Cf. S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 282-83 (1993)
(pointing out that gay rights advocates have "expressly linked sexual orientation to
conduct.").
22. Department of Defense Directive 1304.26, para. B-8(b), at 2-5 (1994) (homosexual
conduct "is a homosexual act, a statement by the applicant that demonstrates a propensity
or intent to engage in homosexual acts, or a homosexual marriage or attempted marriage"),
in Memorandum from Les Aspin, supra note 9. See also 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(f) (West Supp.
1994) (definitions).
23. See S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 265-67 (1993).
24. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, and reh'g granted, 8 F.3d 70
(D.C. Cir. 1994). See also Meinhold v. Department of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455, 1458
(C.D. Cal. 1993) (no rational basis for DOD's policy excluding gays and lesbians). Steffan is
discussed in more detail in this dedicated issue: see Spiro P. Fotopoulos, Note, Steffan v.
Aspin: The Beginning of the End for the Military's Traditional Policy Toward Homosexu-
als, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. - (1994).
25. Steffan, 8 F.3d at 62.
26. Id. at 63.
27. Id. at 67. That conclusion seemingly contradicts arguments made by gay rights
groups that link sexual orientation to conduct. S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 283
(1993) (quoting argument in brief filed by Lambda Legal Defense and Education fund in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
1994]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
specified behavior is not rational.
That argument shuuld ultimately be rejected.2 It is important to
note that the Department of Defense directives at issue in Steffan were
not supported with legislative findings, following extensive hearings on
the issue. The new statute's proscription of service of those demonstrat-
ing a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct is amply supported by
such findings and is consistent with federal caselaw. For example, in Ben
Shalom v. Marsh,29 the court recognized that the military does not have
to take the risk that an avowed homosexual will not engage in such con-
duct that will interfere with the unit's assigned mission.30
In addressing the challenges to the new statute and the implement-
ing regulations, it will be important for the courts to keep in mind the
uniqueness of the military society and its needs. That topic is addressed
next.
III. MILITARY LAW: A UNIQUE LEGAL SYSTEM FOR A SEPARATE SOCIETY
A. The Military: A Separate Society
The military legal system has been recognized by the Supreme Court
as legitimately unique.3 1 This uniqueness is an inevitable outgrowth of
the distinctive requirements of the military establishment itself. For in-
stance, service in the military is not the equivalent of civilian "employ-
ment." The military does not "hire" servicemembers. Those wishing to
don the uniform of the armed forces either enlist or receive commissions
in accordance with detailed statutory and regulatory guidelines.
32
28. This article is not a critique of Steffan or of the numerous other federal decisions
which run counter to the court's conclusion in Steffan. The case is instructive, however, in
anticipating challenges to the new statute which is clearly based on the premise that certain
mental or physical characteristics present risks of undermining the military's mission. The
underlying premise for exclusion of persons with such characteristics is the same as that for
excluding persons whose conduct indicates a propensity to engage in sexual misconduct.
Congress has concluded that such characteristics present a likelihood or possibility that the
military's mission will be impaired. The new statute is apparently not based on moral or
religious arguments as implied by Senator Kennedy's comment which suggests that the de-
bate centers on the religious and moral objections of the public. S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 305 (1993).
29. 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), cert denied sub nom. Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 494
U.S. 1004 (1990).
30. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 460-61, cited in S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong, 1st Sess. 285
(1993). See also id. at 285. That Report makes clear that the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee agreed with the Department of Defense that when a person indicates that he or she
has the propensity to engage in homosexual acts, the military is not required to wait until
the person acts before excluding him or her.
31. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983); Middendorf v. Henry, 425
U.S. 25, 43 (1976). In Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975), the Court indi-
cated that the military "must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without coun-
terpart in civilian life."
32. See, e.g., Department of Defense Directive 1304.26 (1994) (stating eligibility crite-
ria), in Memorandum from Les Aspin, supra note 9. The directive also includes a provision
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Unlike civilian employment, which may be extensively controlled by
civil rights legislation, the statutes and regulations governing entry into
the armed services routinely discriminate. Factors such as height, weight,
age, physical condition, education, and mental capacity may disqualify
people from service, without regard to their motivation or patriotism.33
Physical and mental characteristics, both within and beyond the control
of the applicant, are treated identically.34 Those not qualified for service
are simply not permitted to enter the armed forces.35
There is no right to serve in the armed forces.3 Furthermore, while
entry may be voluntary, there is no assurance that actual service will be
permeated with voluntariness. To the contrary, once a person has
changed his or her status from civilian to servicemember, that person's
duties, privacy, assignments, apparel, length of hair, living conditions, as-
sociates, and freedom of movement are dictated by policymakers or com-
manders.3 7 Once on active duty, the servicemember has no absolute right
to continued service. Failure to conform to governing statutes or regula-
tions may result in a dismissal, an administrative discharge, or a punitive
discharge imposed by a court-martial.
While prudent commanders will almost always seek the advice of
their staffs, the military is not a democratic enterprise . 3  A commander's
for "homosexual conduct." Id. at 2-5.
33. For a discussion of legal authority rejecting the notion that there is a right to serve
in the military, see infra note 36 and accompanying text.
34. The argument might be made that having a sexual preference for members of the
same gender is an immutable, genetic, characteristic, much like a benign racial characteris-
tic. For a recent critique on the question of immutability as a tool for sucessful pro-gay
litigation however, see generally Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of
Biology: A Critique of the Argument From Immutability, 46 STAN. L. Rav. 503 (1994). As
the author noted in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, that argument
is probably irrelevant. For example, if someone is overweight, it is irrelevant for purpose of
entry into the armed forces, whether or not the weight problem is genetic. By the same
token if a servicemember has a propensity to engage in homosexual acts, it should not mat-
ter whether or not that propensity is inherited.
35. See generally David A. Schlueter, The Enlistment Contract: A Uniform Ap-
proach, 77 MIL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977) (noting view that physical and mental qualifications are
for benefit of government).
36. See, e.g., Nieszner v. Mark, 684 F.2d 562, 564-65 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1022 (1983) (denied service due to age); Lindenau v. Alexander, 663 F.2d 68, 72 (10th
Cir. 1981) ("well established that there is no right to enlist in this country's armed ser-
vices"); West v. Brown, 558 F.2d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978)
(divorcee with two children denied service). See also S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
272 (1993) (no constitutional right to serve in military). Cf. Statements of Senator Edward
Kennedy noting that author's "unamplified" testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee that there is no constitutional right to entry into the armed forces became
"Finding #2 of the [Senate Bill 1298]." S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 304 (1993).
37. "[T]he very essence of compulsory service is the subordination of the desires and
interests of the individual to the needs of the service." Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92
(1953).
38. "In the civilian life of a democracy many command few; in the military, however,
this is reversed, for military necessity makes demands on its personnel 'without counterpart
in civilian life.'" Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (quoting Schlesinger v.
1994]
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decision to place individuals in harm's way is not subject to debate and a
vote by those under his or her command. The reason for this rests in the
oft-cited language from the Supreme Court's decision in Ex rel Toth v.
Quarles: "it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be
ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.""9 A core element in the
military's ability to carry out its assigned "primary business" can be sum-
marized in one word: discipline. The military society is a paradigm of
"law and order."'40 Obedience to the leader and teamwork amongst ser-
vicemembers are indispensable ingredients. Servicemembers who question
the authority of a superior run the risk of criminal sanctions."1 Accord-
ingly, a constant and legitimate concern of commanders is whether they
will be able to maintain discipline in carrying out their mission-whether
in times of peace or combat. Events, conditions, or actions which impede
or disrupt discipline potentially threaten the ability of the military to ac-
complish its primary purposes.
B. The Role of "Military Law"
To insure that the armed forces are ready to fulfill the primary pur-
pose for their existence, Congress and the Executive, under the watchful
eye of the judiciary, have promulgated detailed laws, regulations, and di-
rectives designed to insure that discipline is maintained. One component
for carrying out that mission is "military law," a generic term for several
aspects of delivery of legal services to the military community. The Pre-
amble to the 1984 Manual for Courts-Martial defines "military law" as
follows:
Military law consists of the statutes governing the military establish-
ment and regulations issued thereunder, the constitutional powers of
the President and regulations issued thereunder, and the inherent au-
thority of military commanders. Military law includes jurisdiction exer-
cised by courts-martial and the jurisdiction exercised by commanders
with respect to nonjudicial punishment. The purpose of military law is
to . . .promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establish-
ment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United
States."2
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975)).
39. 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
40. "The need for special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the conse-
quent need and justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice, is too
obvious to require extensive discussion; no military organization can function without strict
discipline and regulation that would be unacceptable in a civilian setting." Chappell v. Wal-
lace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983).
41. See, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1988) (contempt to-
ward officials); id. § 889 (disrespect toward superior commissioned officer); id. § 890 (1988)
(disobedience of superior commissioned officer); id. § 892 (1988) (failure to obey order or
regulation). The disobedience offenses are discussed in DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2-4 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter MILITARY CRIMINAL
JUSTICE].
42. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, at I-1 (1984) [hereinafter
[Vol. 29
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In other words, military law is designed to promote good order and disci-
pline so that the primary mission of the military, to fight wars and be
prepared to do so, can be fulfilled. Military law also ensures that ser-
vicemembers' actions are performed in accordance with the rules estab-
lished by Congress and the President. And finally, military law assures
that those subject to the military system will be treated fairly in criminal
and administrative proceedings.
This discussion focuses on two aspects of military law: military ad-
ministrative law and military criminal law. Before turning to those ele-
ments, it is important to note briefly the constitutional basis for the
military legal system.
1. The constitutional basis of military law and the role of Congress
Congress is explicitly empowered under Article I, Section 8, Clause
14, of the Constitution to "make Rules for the Government and Regula-
tion of the land and naval Forces. ' 43 Most of the legislation promulgated
under this authority rests in Title 10 of the United States Code. That
Title includes specific guidance on personnel matters, covering who is
qualified to serve in the armed forces,"4 length of service,45 and the num-
ber of officers who may serve. 46
Title 10 also includes the "Uniform Code of Military Justice" (here-
inafter U.C.M.J.). 4" That Code includes a blend of both procedural rules
and substantive crimes.48 Of particular interest is Article 36,'4 which spe-
cifically authorizes the President to prescribe "[p]retrial, trial, and post-
trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under this
chapter triable in courts-martial. ' 50 An exercise of that authority is found
in the Manual for Courts-Martial.5 1 The Manual provides detailed guid-
ance on military criminal procedures which is lacking in the more general
outline of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
MANUAL].
43. Although Article 1, § 8, Clause 14 is most frequently cited as authority for con-
gressional actions, other provisions in § 8 provide for declaring war, raising and supporting
armies and a Navy, and calling and regulating the Militia.
44. 10 U.S.C. §§ 501-505 (1988).
45. See, e.g., id. §§ 505-507 (enlistments).
46. 10 U.S.C. §§ 521-26 (1988).
47. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-946 (West 1983 & Supp.
1994).
48. Articles 77 through 134 are labeled the "Punitive Articles." Id. §§ 877-934.
49. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1988).
50. Id. § 836(a).
51. MANUAL, supra note 42. The most recent version is dated 1984 and was prescribed
by Exec. Order No. 12,473, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,512 (1984). Earlier editions were prescribed in
1951 and 1968. The most recent edition was an attempt to more closely align military crimi-
nal procedure with federal criminal practice.
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C. Military Administrative Law
Military administrative law consists of those statutes and regulations
which govern the full range of military operations and other military ac-
tivities, including military personnel law. Personnel law, in turn, governs
recruiting, promotions, retention, and separation from the armed forces.
As noted in the preceding discussion, the statutory outline for mili-
tary personnel law is set out in Title 10 of the United States Code. Fur-
ther, the President and the Services have promulgated directives and a
maze of regulations implementing the statutory provisions.5 2 For exam-
ple, while 10 U.S.C. § 505 provides general guidance on eligibility to en-
list, Service Regulations, in turn, establish more detailed procedures and
requirements for enlistment.5 3 The same model holds true for regulations
concerning discharges.
Regarding the eligibility of a particular class of individuals to serve
in the armed forces, Congress possesses full authority to determine the
terms and conditions of service. As the courts have recognized, "[t]he
composition and qualifications of members of the armed forces is a mat-
ter for Congress and the military. '54 While an argument could be made
that Congress and the President share the authority to determine who is
qualified,55 Congress has the clear power to declare, by statute, classes of
individuals who are eligible, or ineligible, for service. 56 As it has done in
the past, Congress may continue to draw only broad guidelines and leave
the specific implementation to the President. The implementation of
statutory guidance is generally a function of military administrative law.
5 7
D. Military Criminal Law
1. The purpose of military criminal law
The criminal law, or military justice, component of military law is
relied upon to enforce the military establishment's norms through puni-
tive measures. The norms consist of statutes, directives, and regulations5
52. See generally 32 C.F.R. §§ 1-399 (1993).
53. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. §§ 571-575 (1993) (outlining enlistment requirements for the
United States Army).
54. Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1224 n.1 (10th Cir. 1984); see also
Lindenau v. Alexander, 663 F.2d. 68, 73 (10th Cir. 1981).
55. The argument might be made that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, under
Article II of the Constitution has power to determine the fitness of a particular person or
persons to serve in the military. However, historically, the primary responsibility for deter-
mining fitness to serve has rested with Congress. President Clinton's signing of the statute
regarding gays in the military probably moots that particular argument and avoids a consti-
tutional debate in the courts over whether the President could have ordered full-fledged
assimilation of gays into the military over Congressional objection. See S. REP. No. 112, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 270-71 (1993) ("The President may supplement, but not supersede, the
rules established by Congress for the government and regulation of the armed forces.").
56. S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 270-71 (1993) (citing Constitution and cases).
57. Those implementing directives are normally the function of the Department of
Defense and the branches of the armed forces.
58. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-946 (West 1983 & Supp.
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The criminal law component of military law is the one most familiar to
the general public and the one which is likely to receive the most atten-
tion in connection with regulation of the sexual conduct of homosexuals
in the armed forces.
To many, the military justice system seems foreign and, at times, in-
herently unfair.59 The public's attention is generally directed at military
justice issues only when a noteworthy case or issue arises, such as na-
tional security trials, allegations of sexual harassment, and whether ho-
mosexual conduct should continue to be treated as a punishable offense.
The public's concerns about the military justice system in such mat-
ters can be attributed to several factors. First, the terminology used in
military justice matters is arcane to most citizens who have had little or
no prior contact with the military. 0 Second, servicemembers may be tried
by court-martial and sentenced to confinement for a wide range of mis-
conduct which has no clear civilian criminal analogy. 1 Critics of military
criminal law seem particularly sensitive to the differences in military
criminal law when a servicemember is prosecuted for an act normally not
subject to criminal prosecution in the civilian community.62
2. How the military criminal system works: A brief overview
Distinguishing status from conduct has been a prevalent issue in the
debate about homosexual service in the armed forces.63 Because the cur-
rent statute and regulations continue to prohibit homosexual conduct,"
but not status, and with the possibility of investigation and discharge of
homosexuals in the armed forces, it is important to discuss both military
criminal law issues and how the military criminal justice system operates.
When an offense is reported, the unit commander is required to con-
duct a thorough and impartial inquiry.6 5 If it appears that an offense has
1994); see also Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Corps regulations as cited
in MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, §§ 3-5(B) to -5(E)(4), at 192.
59. See David A. Schlueter, Military Justice in the 1990's: A Legal System Looking
for Respect, 133 MIL. L. REv. 1, 5-8 (1991) [hereinafter Military Justice in the 1990's]. The
article notes factors which may contribute to criticisms of military justice.
60. See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 801 (1988) (giving
definitions of military terminology).
61. See generally MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, §§ 2-2 to -9 (listing mili-
tary crimes, many of which have no civilian parallel).
62. See Military Justice in the 1990's, supra note 59, at 12.
63. See Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, and reh'g granted, 8
F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
64. Pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1988), the
military may issue orders prohibiting certain sexual conduct. MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
supra note 41, § 2-9(B). These "safe-sex" orders have been upheld by military courts. See
United States v. Womack, 29 M.J. 88, 91 (C.M.A. 1989) (holding "safe-sex" order proscrib-
ing HIV infected appellant from engaging in sodomy or homosexual acts to be
constitutional).
65. MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 5-2 (commander's investigation, pre-
trial restraints, and confinement).
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been committed by the accused,6 the commander may: (1) begin nonjudi-
cial punishment proceedings under Article 15, U.C.M.J.;6 7 (2) begin ad-
ministrative discharge procedures under the appropriate Service
regulations;6" (3) or prefer court-martial charges. 9 In making a decision,
the commander may consider the nature of the offense, the prior record
of the servicemember, and the available evidence.70 The unit commander
has broad discretion.7 1 In some instances, a superior commander may in-
dicate that certain offenses should be forwarded to higher command
levels for processing.72 Usually, though, any attempts to tell a subordinate
commander how to handle a particular case would be considered unlawful
command influence.
7 3
If charges are preferred, a convening authority may ultimately refer
the charges to a particular court-martial, a temporary tribunal, for trial.
74
There are three types of courts-martial: summary, special, and general.15
More serious charges are referred to general courts-martial,76 after a pre-
trial, Article 32 hearing is held on the question of whether the charges
appear to be supported by the evidence.7
66. For a discussion of options after an offense has been committed, see MILITARY
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 5-2.
67. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1988). The U.C.M.J. sets out
the statutory guidelines for imposing punishments on servicemembers for minor offenses.
Id. The individual Services have promulgated additional regulatory guidance concerning
these procedures which are set out in MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, §§ 3-5(B)
to -5(E)(4).
68. Each of the Services has promulgated regulations concerning discharge of ser-
vicemembers for a variety of reasons, including misconduct. See Army Regulation 635-200,
which allows administrative discharge for misconduct or unsuitability. If the administrative
discharge route is chosen, the accused is entitled to some procedural due process: written
notice, the opportunity to consult with counsel, and, in some instances, a hearing before a
board of officers who will hear evidence and make a recommendation to higher authorities
on disposition of the servicemember. See MANUAL, supra note 42, at V-2 to -4. See also
MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 3-5.
69. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 830 (1988).
70. MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 3-3(c); see also MANUAL, supra note
42, at V-1.
71. MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 6-1 n.15.
72. Id. § 6-4(C).
73. Id. § 6-4(B).
74. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-824 (1988). A "convening au-
thority" is an officer, authorized by the U.C.M.J. to order the formation of a court-martial,
i.e., convene it, and then refer court-martial charges to it for trial. Id. § 822.
75. See R.C.M. §§ 201(f)(1)-(3), reprinted in MANUAL, supra note 42, at 11-9 to -11;
see also Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1988). The discussion here fo-
cuses on the general and special court-martial. Summary courts-martial are not used very
often; a servicemember tried by a summary court-martial is generally not entitled to the
same level of rights as a servicemember being tried before a general or special court-martial.
See, e.g., Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 32 (1976); United States v. Kendig, 36 M.J. 291,
295 (C.M.A. 1993); United States v. Ezell, 6 M.J. 307, 313 (C.M.A. 1979).
76. See MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, §, 4-3(A) to -3(C) (showing that
general courts-martial have more jurisdiction and can hand out stiffer penalties than other
types of courts-martial).
77. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1988).
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Throughout the process, the servicemember is entitled to free legal
representation from a uniformed lawyer,7 8 called a "JAG" (an officer in
the Judge Advocate General's Corps). Also, similar to civilian criminal
trials, broad discovery rights and other due process and constitutional
protections are available.8 0 The presiding officer at a general or special
court-martial is a military judge-an armed forces lawyer with many
years of experience."1 The accused has the option of requesting trial by
judge alone (a bench trial) or with "members" (the equivalent of a jury
trial).8 2 If the latter option is exercised, the convening authority selects
the court members who will decide the case.
8 3
At trial, the Military Rules of Evidence apply.8 4 Those rules, which
closely parallel the Federal Rules of Evidence, were promulgated in 1980
as part of an attempt to adopt, wherever possible, federal criminal law
practice and procedure.8 5 The Military Rules of Evidence also include a
set of rules creating privileges for certain confidential communications.
For example, statements made to lawyers, 8 clergy, 7 or spouses8 are nor-
mally not admissible.
If the accused is convicted, he or she may appeal to a Court of Mili-
tary Review consisting of panels of senior uniformed lawyers.89 Again, the
accused is entitled to free legal representation." Appeals from the Courts
of Review, go to the United States Court of Military Appeals, 91 consisting
of five civilian judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate.9 2 This step in the appellate process, often referred to as "The
Supreme Court of the Military" insures that there will be civilian review
of courts-martial convictions. In 1983, Congress provided that an accused
servicemember could seek further discretionary review by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
9 3
In discussing the issue of gays in the military, it is important to re-
member the purpose of military criminal law: to insure that the norms for
78. Id. § 838(b)(1), (3).
79. See generally MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 10-1 (noting the broad
discovery granted under military law).
80. Id. § 1-7.
81. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C § 826 (1988). See generally Weiss v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 752 (1994) (discussion of role of military judges).
82. MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 12-3.
83. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1988).
84. See STEPHAN A. SALTZBURG, LEE D. SCHINASI & DAVID A. SCHLUETER, Military
Rules of Evidence Manual 6 (3d ed. 1991) (discussion of applicability of rules of evidence)
[hereinafter MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL].
85. Id. at ix to xii (recounting background of Military Rules of Evidence).
86. MIL. R. EVID. 502 (lawyer-client privilege).
87. M L. R. EVID. 503 (communications to clergy).
88. MIL. R. EVID. 504 (husband-wife privilege).
89. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1988). See generally MILITARY
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 17-15 (discussing the composition of the court).
90. MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 17-14.
91. Id. §§ 17-15(c), 17-16.
92. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 942 (Supp. IV 1992).
93. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 1259 (1988).
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a servicemember's conduct established by Congress and the President are
met. And while discipline is a by-product of the system, those involved in
military law must insure that "justice" is accomplished. That point was
made in the 1960 Powell Report:
Discipline-a state of mind which leads to a willingness to obey an or-
der no matter how unpleasant or dangerous the task to be per-
formed-is not a characteristic of a civilian community. Development
of this state of mind among soldiers is a command responsibility and a
necessity. In the development of discipline, correction of individuals is
indispensable; in correction, fairness or justice is indispensable. Thus, it
is a mistake to talk of balancing discipline and justice-the two are
inseparable.
Once a case is before a court-martial it should be realized by all
concerned that the sole concern is to accomplish justice under the law.
This does not mean justice as determined by the commander referring
a case or by anyone not duly constituted to fulfill a judicial role. It is
not proper to say that a military court-martial has a dual function as an
instrument of discipline and as an instrument of justice. It is an instru-
ment of justice and in fulfilling this function it will promote
discipline .
4
Without regard to whether one views the military criminal law as a means
of enforcing justice, discipline, or both, it is important to remember that
the primary purpose of the military establishment is to fight wars and to
be prepared to fight wars; in other words, to protect national security. As
the Supreme Court has recognized, the "trial of soldiers to maintain disci-
pline is merely incidental to an army's primary fighting function. To the
extent that those responsible for performance of this primary function are
diverted from it by the necessity of trying cases, the basic fighting pur-
pose of the armies is not served."95 Thus, it is not in the best interests of
a commander to conduct "witch hunts," or to prosecute every single act
of misfeasance or malfeasance. Instead, the goal of commanders is to in-
still enough pride and discipline in their units to avoid the need for disci-
plinary action.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SERVICEMEMBERS IN THE
ARMED FORCES
A. Differing Standards in Application of the Bill of Rights
It is now well settled in civilian and military jurisprudence that, with
few exceptions,"6 the constitutional protections within the Bill of Rights
94. REPORT TO HONORABLE WILBER M. BRUCKER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, BY THE Cot-
MrrTEE ON THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN THE
ARMY [POWELL REPORT] 11, 12 (1960).
95. United States v. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
96. The rights not available are the right to indictment by grand jury, U.S. CONST.
amend. V; the right to bail, Courtney v. Williams, 1 M.J. 267, 271 (C.M.A. 1976); and the
right to jury trial, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 n.68 (1957).
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are generally available to servicemembers, but not to the same extent as
to their civilian counterparts. 97 The differences are grounded on the spe-
cial needs of the military establishment to maintain discipline. It may be
that the key to federal litigation on the issue of gays in the military rests
in large part on whether the courts hearing the challenges to the new
policy will be willing to recognize the special and unique needs of the
military. The following discussion briefly notes those distinctions, where
they exist.
B. First Amendment Protections: Freedom of Speech, Religion, Right
to Associate
1. An overview
The First Amendment freedoms are considered among the most
prized liberty interests: the right to free speech,98 the right to freely prac-
tice one's religion,"9 the right to be free from establishment of an official
religion,' and the right to associate with others. 101 But as the courts
have recognized, these rights are not absolute and may be subject to gov-
ernment regulation where the government can establish a sufficiently
compelling reason for doing S.' 0 2 Indeed, some forms of speech are not
protected at all, for example pornography. 10 3 Other forms, such as com-
mercial speech, receive only moderate protection.' 04
2. Free speech in the military context
In the military context, the Supreme Court has recognized that ser-
vicemembers do not enjoy the same degree of First Amendment protec-
tion available to their civilian counterparts. 10 5 The Court has stated that
a servicemember is not protected under the First Amendment if the
speech "undermines the effectiveness of response to command."'' 06 In en-
forcing that rule, commanders are given a wide berth, as long as they are
not irrational or arbitrary.
97. HOIER E. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY §§ 2-103 to -106 (1972).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
102. See S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 278 (1993). In this case the reasons
would include morale, discipline, and unit cohesion.
103. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 53 (1973).
104. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770-72 (1976).
105. MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 13-3(N)(3).
106. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974). The commander's restrictions on ex-
pression might also extend to citizens attempting to use the military forum for expressing
their views. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 361 (1980) (upholding regulation re-
stricting circulation of petitions on Air Force bases); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840
(1976) (upholding regulation banning speeches and demonstrations of partisan political na-
ture on military reservations).
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3. Freedom of religion
In the area of freedom of religion, the Supreme Court has recognized
the government's authority to regulate some forms of religious practices
within the military. For example in Goldman v. Weinberger,107 the Court
upheld the government's decision to ban wearing of religious apparel.
Congress later modified the effect of that decision by accommodating the
religious beliefs of servicemembers through legislation which now permits
them to wear religious apparel which does not interfere with their per-
formance and is "neat and conservative." ' It is important to note that,
in the process of accommodating the religious beliefs of the ser-
vicemembers, Congress delegated to the military (the "Secretary con-
cerned") the authority to decide whether the religious apparel in question
was permissible. 0 9
4. Freedom to associate
With regard to the freedom to associate, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized certain penumbral First Amendment rights, such as the right to
associate with others for the purposes of political, religious, or expressive
activities.110 The military may also regulate this form of speech, however,
if it can show a compelling or important reason for doing so. A typical
example of this would be a military regulation declaring certain civilian
establishments or organizations off-limits. 11 1 If the "association" is inti-
mate in nature, such as a family, the right to associate is protected, not
by the First Amendment, but by a penumbra privacy right, discussed
below.
1 1 2
C. Fourth Amendment: Right to Be Free From Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures
A servicemember has some protection under the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 3 But the right is not abso-
lute, in view of special military interests which may outweigh the ser-
vicemember's privacy interests. 14 The burden for showing that a
107. 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986). "The desirability of dress regulations in the military is
decided by the appropriate military officials, and they are under no constitutional mandate
to abandon their considered professional judgment." Id. at 509.
108. 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1988) (some religious apparel permitted).
109. Id.
110. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
111. See, e.g., Blameuser v. Andrews, 630 F.2d 538, 543-44 (7th Cir. 1980) (association
of white officer with white supremacist group).
112. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Ezell, 6 M.J. 307, 315 (C.M.A. 1979).
114. United States v. Fagan, 28 M.J. 64, 69 (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 823 (1989)
(court noted that servicemembers recognize and accept limits on their liberty and privacy,




different rule should apply in the military rests upon the government. 115
Although the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides no specific
guidance in this area, the Military Rules of Evidence provide specific
rules for how, and when, a commander may search a servicemember's
property.116 These rules of evidence, when adopted, were intended to re-
flect the then existing state of constitutional law on searches and
seizures.1 1 7 Further, the military courts rely heavily on federal court deci-
sions interpreting the Fourth Amendment." Thus, military search and
seizure law, with few exceptions, parallels civilian precedent.
The differences in the two systems generally center on the ser-
vicemember's reduced reasonable expectation of privacy, either because
of overriding and important government interests or because of the lack
of physical privacy caused by special living conditions.119 One of the most
notable differences is the military law concerning "inspections." A com-
mander may conduct an inspection, without probable cause, to "deter-
mine and to ensure the security, military fitness, or good order and
discipline of the unit, organization, installation, vessel, aircraft, or vehi-
cle." 1' 20 An inspection would typically consist of a complete examination
of every element of a servicemember's living area and personal belongings
in a manner considered unacceptable in a civilian setting, without a show-
ing of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion.'2 "
If a court determines that a servicemember's Fourth Amendment
rights have been violated, any evidence obtained as a result of that viola-
tion, and any derivative evidence, will be excluded.
22
D. Fifth Amendment: The Constitutional and Statutory Right Against
Self-Incrimination
A servicemember's right against self-incrimination generally parallels
the prevailing civilian law on the same subject. 23 But in the inherently
coercive environment of military life, the right against self-incrimination
takes on added importance for servicemembers. Servicemembers enjoy
not only the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, but also the protec-
tions afforded in Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2 '
which provides in part that "[n]o person subject to [the U.C.M.J.] may
compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the
115. Courtney v. Williams; 1 M.J. 267, 270 (C.M.A. 1976).
116. See MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 84, at 243-399.
117. United States v. Postle, 20 M.J. 632, 643 (N.M.C.M.R. 1985).
118. Id. at 645.
119. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 277 (1993) (testimony of General
Colin Powell describing living conditions of servicemembers which provide only minimal
privacy).
120. MIL. R. EVID. 313(b).
121. See id. (no requirement for probable cause is contained in the rule).
122. MIL. R EVID. 311(a).
123. See MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 84, at 100-03.
124. United States v. Ray, 15 M.J. 808, 810 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983).
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answer to which may tend to incriminate him."' 25
Additionally, Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
provides that servicemembers suspected of an offense must first be
warned of their right to remain silent.226 A similar provision exists in Mil-
itary Rule of Evidence 301.12 If the government desires potentially in-
criminating testimony from a servicemember, it may obtain that
testimony by granting either testimonial or transactional immunity to the
servicemember. 28 Contrary to popular belief, the government may not
override a servicemember's legitimate right against self-incrimination by
simply ordering the individual to provide the information. 21 Without im-
munity, an order to do so would clearly violate the servicemember's right
to remain silent.
E. Sixth Amendment Rights: Counsel; Confrontation; Compulsory
Process; and Trial by Jury
With the exception of the right to trial by jury, which is not applica-
ble in military cases, a servicemember being tried by a general or special
court-martial is entitled to all of the Sixth Amendment rights available in
a civilian trial. That is, a military accused is entitled to representation by
civilian counsel (provided for at no expense to the government), individ-
ual military counsel upon request, or assigned military counsel.130 Mili-
tary defense counsel are provided to the accused without cost. 3'
A military accused is also entitled to the full range of rights emanat-
ing from the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, that is, the
right to request defense witnesses to appear. 3 ' Depending on the nature
and importance of the expected testimony, the court may direct that the
prosecution obtain the presence of the defense witness at government ex-
pense, or risk abatement of the proceedings."3 3 Civilian counsel practicing
before courts-martial are often surprised, and pleased, to learn of the very
liberal discovery policies in effect.
The accused is also generally entitled to the same confrontation
rights available to a civilian defendant. That is, an accused is entitled to
cross-examine adverse witnesses'" and block otherwise inadmissible hear-
125. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 831(a) (1988).
126. Id. § 831(b). These rights warnings preceded the Supreme Court's mandate in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that suspects be advised of the right to remain
silent and the right to the presence of counsel. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 489 (citing Article
31(b)).
127. MIL. R. EvID. 301(a).
128. United States v. Newman, 14 M.J. 474, 481 (C.M.A. 1988).
129. See United States v. Lee, 25 M.J. 457, 460 (C.M.A. 1988).
130. MIL. R. EVID. 313(d)(2).
131. Id.
132. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1988) (production of
witnesses).
133. United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 611 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990).
134. United States v. Lonetree, 31 M.J. 849, 858 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1813 (1993).
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say evidence.' 35 However, the one Sixth Amendment right not available to
servicemembers is the right to trial by jury.13 Thus, the Supreme Court's
rulings concerning the size and composition of juries are not applicable to
the military.
F. The Fundamental Right to Privacy; Liberty Interests
While many of the foregoing Bill of Rights protections may not nec-
essarily impact directly on the issue of permitting homosexuals to serve in
the armed services, there is one right that is directly implicated: the fun-
damental right to privacy. The Supreme Court has recognized that citi-
zens have a penumbral, fundamental right to privacy which includes the
right to marry, 3 ' to procreate, ' 3  or to obtain an abortion. 3" If a court
agrees that the military is nonetheless infringing on the right to privacy,
the government must be prepared to show that it has a compelling inter-
est in doing so and that the means chosen for advancing that interest are
necessary.'40
To date, the Supreme Court has resisted attempts to broaden the
right to privacy into other activities. For example, in Bowers v. Hard-
wick,' 4 ' in a closely divided decision, the Court held that there is no fun-
damental right to engage in homosexual acts.
42
An activity not protected by the right to privacy may nonetheless be
considered a liberty interest, also subject to a substantive due process
analysis-which tests whether the governmental action is reasonably re-
lated to a legitimate government purpose. 43 Under that approach, the
courts have generally given the military wide latitude in regulating mat-
ters such as grooming, dress, hygiene, financial matters, use of alcohol,
and association with others. The Court of Military Appeals has stated:
All activities which are reasonably necessary to safeguard and protect
the morale, discipline and usefulness of the members of a command
135. United States v. Duncan, 30 M.J. 1284, 1287-88 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990).
136. See, e.g., Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969), overruled on other
grounds by Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37
n.68 (1957). United States v. Gray, 37 M.J. 751, 755 (A.C.M.R. 1993), stands for the proposi-
tion that servicemembers do not enjoy the right to trial by jury.
137. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965).
138. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
139. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
140. Id. at 155.
141. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
142. Id. at 191-92. But see S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 286 (1993) (noting
that, in addition to civilian cases, federal law, specifically Title VII, does not prevent dis-
crimination based on homosexuality).
143. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982). But see S. REP. No. 112, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 285 (1993) (citing cases supporting view that homosexual conduct is neither
a fundamental right nor a liberty interest).
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and are directly connected with the maintenance of good order in the
services are subject to the control of the officers upon whom the respon-
sibility of the command rests.
1 44
In the context of admitting homosexuals into the military, even though
there might not be a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,
there might still be constitutional issues concerning the ability of the
commander to "control" sexual activities which he or she believed would
impact on the morale, discipline, or usefulness of the members in the
unit.
G. Summary
This brief review of constitutional protections for servicemembers
demonstrates several key points. First, with few exceptions, ser-
vicemembers are entitled to the same constitutional liberties available to
civilians. Second, those liberties may not always apply to the same extent
as in the civilian setting. Third, the justification for governmental restric-
tions on constitutional liberties available in the civilian setting is linked
with the primary purpose of the military establishment - to protect na-
tional security. Where the military's need for discipline or morale is
threatened, the servicemember's constitutional rights may be restricted
by the commander. Fourth, the Supreme Court has indicated repeatedly
that it will defer to Congress and the President in overseeing the military
establishment, even where individual rights of servicemembers are
implicated.1 45
V. LEGAL ISSUES POSED BY REMOVING OR MODIFYING
THE BAN AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS
A. In General
Legal challenges to the new statutory policy and Department of De-
fense directives are inevitable. Some challenges will directly implicate
constitutional law issues; others will raise questions about possible statu-
tory amendments to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Many possible
challenges are, for now, only hypothetical. For example, an issue such as
possible military benefits derived from homosexual marriages probably
would have arisen had Congress decided to fully assimilate homosexuals
into the military community. Nonetheless, it is important to note that
Congress did consider such issues in deciding not to treat homosexuals as
a protected class.
144. United States v. Martin, 5 C.M.R. 102, 104 (C.M.A. 1952).
145. See, e.g., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987) (affirming Court of




B. Potential Constitutional Law Issues
Whatever the nature of the administrative or criminal law decisions
affecting servicemembers, 14 6 potential constitutional challenges to those
decisions exist, many of which can only be imagined at this point. Past
litigation in the federal courts indicates that the potential constitutional
challenges are not fanciful.
Virtually any military personnel decision is subject to the argument
that it unfairly discriminates, violates fundamental privacy interests, or
infringes on First Amendment freedoms. As noted in the discussion of the
application of the Bill of Rights to servicemembers,'147 courts generally
defer to the decisions of Congress and of military leadership in deciding
which policies best advance the management of the military.' 48 Although
the courts typically defer to Congress in assessing the constitutionality of
a law governing military matters, that deference is partly based on the
belief that, in adopting a particular rule, Congress has carefully consid-
ered potential issues, balanced the interests involved, and drawn the line
in a manner it believed to be the most appropriate. 4 9 Given the critical
role of legal precedent in court decisions, it seems safe to assume that,
absent a major shift in the current philosophy of the federal courts, judi-
cial deference will continue with regard to any decisions affecting service
of homosexuals in the armed services.
The following discussion briefly addresses several potential constitu-
tional law issues. This discussion is not an attempt to address or answer
all possible issues; rather, it is an attempt to demonstrate the reasonable-
ness of Congress' position on the issue of gays in the military and to iden-
tify what might be expected from challenges to that position. Also, it is
important to note that, even if a particular constitutional law challenge is
not made, there may still exist a feeling of discontent among ser-
vicemembers, either heterosexual or homosexual, which could impact on
discipline.
146. For a discussion of administrative law issues, see infra notes 185-89 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of criminal law issues, see infra notes 190-248 and accompany-
ing text.
147. For a discussion of the application of the Bill of Rights to servicemembers, see
supra notes 96-145 and accompanying text.
148. For a discussion of judicial and legislative deference to military leadership, see
supra note 145 and accompanying text.
149. See Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 760 (1994) (stating that Constitution
contemplates that Congress has plenary power in governance of military); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (stating that the Court's deference is "at its apogee" when
reviewing congressional decisions regarding military).
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1. First Amendment issues;* challenges to the "don't tell"
component
As discussed earlier, 150 generally the courts recognize that the mili-
tary may regulate speech within the military context.'0 ' To so regulate,
the military must be prepared to demonstrate an overriding military
necessity.
In the context of homosexuals in the military, most courts have held
that a servicemember does not have a First Amendment right to declare
that he or she is a homosexual.15 2 The rationale is that, while a ser-
vicemember may have a right to advocate a particular viewpoint, it is an
entirely different matter to admit being homosexual, which is service dis-
qualifying. That is, so long as it is disqualifying to admit homosexuality
while on active duty, a servicemember's statement that he or she is gay
will be considered an admission not protected by the First Amendment. 5 3
Thus, any effect on speech would be considered incidental to the military
goals of excluding homosexuals.
A further issue arises when considering whether the government may
proscribe servicemembers' statements concerning either homosexual or
heterosexual lifestyles.25 4 Given the emotionally charged positions taken
on both sides of this issue, it is not difficult to imagine that ser-
vicemembers would eventually join the debate and that, in order to main-
tain discipline, a commander would simply order that no particular
viewpoint could be advocated. The order could take the form of banning
not only verbal speech but also display of posters, notices, and other
forms of expression. Those actions would clearly raise First Amendment
issues.'
55
Similarly, it is not unusual for servicemembers to form clubs on mili-
tary installations to further their mutual interests in sports, hobbies, reli-
gious beliefs, or cultural heritage. If a group of servicemembers desired to
form such a club or support group for homosexual rights, could the mili-
tary ban such activity or membership? It would be difficult to do so, par-
ticularly if the military tolerated other organizations based upon
150. For a discussion of the military's ability to regulate speech, see supra notes 105-
06 and accompanying text.
151. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). See also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 349
(1980).
152. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom.
Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
153. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub
nom. Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 494 U.S 1004 (1990). But see Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216P
(D. Me. filed April 3, 1984) (ROTC cadet had First Amendment right), vacated on other
grounds, 755 F.2d 182 (1st. Cir. 1985).
154. See Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that ser-
vicemember may talk about homosexuality and remain in the army, as long as not identify-
ing herself as being homosexual); see also Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied sub nom. Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
155. For a discussion on free speech issues in the military context, see generally MILI-
TARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 13-3(N)(3).
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expressive activities. 5 '
While almost all of the public's attention has been focused on the
free speech rights of gay men and lesbians, there is the related problem of
potentially chilling the First Amendment liberties of those who oppose
assimilation of homosexuals into the military. Whether the restriction of
their speech would be through "sensitivity training," adoption of a code
of sexual conduct, or amendments to the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, heterosexual servicemembers could argue that their First Amend-
ment freedoms are being infringed, either because they are required to
listen to speech they would rather not hear,'5 7 or because they might not
be free to register their concerns about homosexual servicemembers. Ad-
ditionally, heterosexual servicemembers might argue that, by requiring
them to listen to "sensitivity" lectures about homosexuals' status, or tol-
erance of homosexual acts, their religious beliefs are being violated.
The same issues would arise from enforcement of so-called "hate
speech" statutes, regulations or directives which would bar ser-
vicemembers from using derogatory terms to describe homosexuals.15 De-
partment of Defense directives specifically prohibit such harassment. 59
What the law makes clear is that no matter how well-intentioned such
laws or directives might be, they potentially implicate First Amendment
concerns.
Opponents of the revised statute and regulations are sure to argue
that they infringe upon, or chill, their First Amendment rights. For exam-
ple, the "policy" provision in the statute clearly indicates that prohibited
homosexual conduct includes any statement by a servicemember that "he
or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect."' 60 That provi-
sion could prohibit a wide range of statements other than those which
advocate a homosexual lifestyle. However, the military could defend the
stated policy by arguing that a statement indicating a propensity or in-
tent to commit homosexual acts would be inconsistent with the good or-
der and discipline required in the military environment. As noted above,
generally the courts defer to the military in regulating servicemembers'
speech if there is reason to believe that the speech would interfere with
the military mission.'
156. Although the military clearly has the authority to limit certain forms of speech,
any attempt to limit expressive behavior based on the content of the speech would raise
First Amendment claims. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (finding that a
picketing ordinance impermissibly discriminated).
157. See generally Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to
be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 153 (1972).
158. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992) (finding that an ordi-
nance prohibiting speech which insults, or provokes violence, on basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender is facially overbroad).
159. See Applicant Briefing Item on Separation Policy ("[t]he Armed Forces do not
tolerate harassment or violence against any servicemember for any reason"), in Department
of Defense Directive 1304.26 (1994), in Memorandum From Les Aspin, supra note 9.
160. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(b)(2) (West Supp. 1994).
161. For a discussion of judicial deference to the military regarding speech regula-
tiond, see supra notes 105-06, 145, and 149 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the Department of Defense guidelines briefly address
rights of association. The guidelines indicate that mere servicemember as-
sociation with known homosexuals is not, in itself, sufficient information
to justify an investigation, or serve as the basis for discharge. 162 Nonethe-
less, as a practical matter, a servicemember's close and continual associa-
tion with known homosexuals could certainly be a factor considered in
deciding whether to initiate an investigation and, to that extent, might
cast a chill on such association. Again, federal and military courts have
determined that the military may properly restrict the associational
rights of servicemembers upon a rational basis showing for such
regulation.
163
2. Equal protection issues: treating homosexual servicemembers
differently
Perhaps one of the most difficult, overarching, legal issues Congress
has faced, and the courts will face, is to what extent the military will be
required to provide equal protection for homosexuals. The right to equal
protection under the law means that similarly situated individuals will be
treated similarly by the government.164 The potential legal question
before the courts is whether homosexuals should be treated as being simi-
larly situated with all other servicemembers. 65 Most of the attention has
focused on the denial of access to full-fledged protection in the armed
forces. Ironically, as noted below, the DOD Policy arguably creates some
procedural protections for servicemembers suspected of sexual miscon-
duct which are not otherwise available to other servicemembers suspected
of improper conduct.
166
The principle of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause is that regulations which treat one class differ-
ently from another must be reasonable to be constitutionally sound. 6 7 If
162. See, e.g., Department of Defense Directive 1332.30 (1994) (Separation of Regular
Commissioned Officers), in Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick, supra note 11, which pro-
vides that credible information for an investigation does not exist if "[t]he only information
known is an associational activity such as going to a gay bar, possessing or reading homosex-
ual publications, associating with known homosexuals, or marching in a gay rights rally in
civilian clothes. Such activity, in and of itself, does not provide evidence of homosexual
conduct." Id. at 8-2.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Hoard, 12 M.J. 563 (A.C.M.R. 1981) (prohibiting asso-
ciation between trainees and training staff).
164. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.2, at 570 (4th
ed. 1991) [hereinafter NOWAK & ROTUNDA].
165. Similar attention has focused on equal protection challenges to regulations which
treated female servicemembers differently. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(treating female servicemember differently regarding dependency status). Currently, the
military establishment continues to treat female servicemembers differently than male ser-
vicemembers, for example, in terms of living arrangements, certain assignments, and physi-
cal requirements.
166. For a discussion of the impact of this policy on investigatory decisionmaking, see
infra notes 210-21 and accompanying text.
167. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 164, § 14.1 (discussing application of equal
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the class receiving less beneficial treatment is a suspect class,168 or if the
activity at issue implicates a fundamental right, courts will apply a strict
scrutiny analysis, which means that the government must show a compel-
ling need for the different treatment and that the means chosen are nec-
essary.1 9 Further, governmental actions that discriminate on the basis of
gender are subject to an intermediate, or mid-level, scrutiny.17 Other-
wise, the test is usually a rational basis test which requires a legitimate
governmental purpose and means chosen which are rationally related to
that purpose.
171
To date, the courts have generally declined to treat homosexuals as a
suspect class, or even as a quasi-suspect class, which might entitle them
to something more than a mere rational basis test.172 Nonetheless, oppo-
nents of the ban have argued, and will no doubt continue to argue, that
the ban is based upon the same types of prejudices which at one time
precluded blacks from full integration into the armed forces.' 7 3 Congress
apparently rejected that linkage, however. In hearings before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, General Colin Powell, an African-American,
testified that:
I am well aware of the attempts to draw parallels [to] the positions
used years ago to deny opportunities to African-Americans .... I need
no reminders concerning the history of African-Americans in the de-
fense of their Nation and the tribulations they faced. I am a part of
that history.
Skin color is a benign, non-behavioral, characteristic. Sexual orien-
tation is perhaps the most profound of human characteristics. Compari-
son of the two is a convenient but invalid argument. I believe the
privacy rights of all Americans in uniform have to be considered, espe-
cially since those rights are often infringed upon by the conditions of
military service."7
protection analysis to federal acts); see also id. § 14.2 (discussing the concept of equal
protection).
168. The term "suspect class" is used by the courts to define a group of individuals
who, by their nature, have been subject to discrimination in the past and, traditionally, have
been politically powerless. Generally, courts have restricted the term to racial minorities,
national origin, and alienage. Id. § 14.3, at 576.
169. See id. § 14.3, at 575-76 (describing strict scrutiny test).
170. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (defining intermediate level scrutiny for
gender discrimination cases).
171. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). See
also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 164, § 14.3, at 574-75 (description of rational relation-
ship test).
172. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 62-63 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, and reh'g granted, 8
F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
173. See, e.g., Lynne Duke, Drawing Parallels: Gays and Blacks Linking Military Ban
to Integration Fight Stirs Outrage, Sympathy, WASH. Posy, Feb. 13, 1993, at Al.
174. S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 282 (1993). That report also makes clear
that the Senate Armed Services Committee was aware of the existence of prejudice in soci-
ety against gays and lesbians, but that "its position on the service of gays and lesbians is not
based upon stereotypes, but upon the impact in the military setting of the conduct that is
an integral element of homosexuality." Id. The Report also indicates the nexus between
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Some commentators have suggested that, if Congress had permitted
homosexuals to serve openly in the military, then Congress would have
had to consider assigning them only to noncombat units, 1 5 lest the risk of
HIV infection render them ineffective for such things as "battlefield
blood transfusions." Still others have suggested assigning homosexuals to
units where it is not likely that they will be placed in close, intimate con-
tact with heterosexuals.1
6
Other commentators have suggested that the military should adopt a
sort of "separate but equal" approach to admitting homosexuals into the
armed services.'" For example, homosexuals could be segregated into
particular units, tasks, or locations. Even assuming that suggestion had
merit, it would raise additional issues for resolution to the extent that the
creation of "havens" would discriminate against homosexuals.1' 8 And it
would place additional burdens on heterosexual servicemembers to fill as-
signments not open to homosexuals, which would be particularly prob-
lematic in the case of combat duty.
7 9
Whatever the merit of these suggestions, the fact remains that any
different treatment of homosexual servicemembers than heterosexual
members would inevitably raise equal protection concerns.
sexual orientation and conduct. Id.
175. See, e.g., RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYs/JusTrICE 196 (1988); Gisela Caldwell, Note, The
Seventh Circuit in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh: Equating Speech with Conduct, 24 Loy. LA. L.
REV. n.216 (1991) (stating that Israel allows homosexuals to serve in noncombat positions).
176. See Eric Schmitt, The Gay Troop Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, § 1, at 1.
177. The idea of separating homosexuals from other servicemembers was discussed
during the Senate debates, drawing an analogy to women in the military:
But I think it would be irrational to develop military personnel policies on the
basis that all gays and all lesbians will remain celibate or that they will not be
attracted to others. Because when dealing with issues involving different gen-
ders, we have to assume that in most instances declaration of status, of sexual
orientation, is going to result in conduct or at least sexual attraction. And when
that happens, according to thousands of pages of testimony from hundreds if not
thousands of individuals, that tends to seriously undermine and break down unit
cohesion and unit morale.
The courts have consistently held that there is a rational basis for coming to
this conclusion. That is the reason why we separate men and women. If we sim-
ply operated on a conduct status in the military, then there is no justification to
separate men and women. There is no justification for having separate barracks.
Women could charge that under equal protection of the law they deserved to not
be segregated into separate barracks. No one would advocate having men and
women live together on a 24-hour-a-day basis in the same living conditions with-
out the issue of sexual attraction playing a very major role in the morale, in the
discipline, in the good order and unit cohesion of the unit.
139 CONG. REC. S11157-04, S11190 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1993) (statement of Sen. Coats); cf.
Robert D. Stone, Comment, The American Military: We're Looking for a Few Good
[Straight] Men, 29 GONz. L. REV. 133, 161-62 (1993).
178. See, e.g., Peter S. Pritchard, Justice Demands End to Ban on Gays in the Mili-
tary, U.S.A. TODAY, March 31, 1993, at 10A.




3. The inevitable clash of competing privacy interests
Much of the public's attention has been focused on the privacy rights
of homosexuals: the right to choose and practice a particular lifestyle. But
it is also necessary to analyze the potential impact on the privacy inter-
ests of heterosexual servicemembers 8 0
Although the recent change in policy accommodates the desires of
homosexuals to serve in the military, heterosexuals who believe that their
privacy interests will be jeopardized might raise legal challenges. The
right to privacy includes an autonomy feature-the right to make per-
sonal choices in life. 81 It also includes a personal security feature which
focuses on the right to be left alone.18 2 In the arena of human sexuality,
these two rights take on greater importance. To admit homosexuals into
the military arguably advances their privacy interest. At the same time,
however, it raises concerns about the ability of heterosexual ser-
vicemembers to be free from unwanted sexual advances or attention com-
ing from homosexuals.
Congress had, and the courts now have, a good model from which to
consider this issue: service of women in the military. In order to accom-
modate what might be viewed as competing privacy interests, ser-
vicemembers are segregated by gender in most living conditions.
Similarly, it can be argued that the legal issue of protecting competing
privacy interests among homosexual and heterosexual servicemembers
will require the same approach.
8 3
This issue is of critical importance. Unlike most civilian jobs, at the
end of the work day, servicemembers typically do not leave the installa-
tion and return to civilian life. The servicemember's home is often a small
two-person tent, a cramped berth in a submarine, or an open-bay bar-
racks where a large number of individuals share, not only a common
sleeping area, but common shower and restroom facilities. In such condi-
tions, what little physical privacy exists is highly treasured.'
C. Military Administrative Law Issues: What Might Have Been
Since the new policy prohibits only homosexual conduct, it is possi-
ble that servicemembers with a known homosexual orientation will be
permitted to serve, assuming that they refrain from such conduct. How-
ever, the policy is silent on the possible implications on administrative
law issues, because if a servicemember admits to being a homosexual, or
commits homosexual acts, he or she is not qualified for military service.
In reviewing the constitutionality of the current policy, courts should
180. Id. at 277-78 (discussing privacy in the military).
181. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 164, § 14.26, at 157-58.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Judith Hicks Stiehm, Managing the Military's Homosexual Exclusion
Policy: Text and Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685, 692-93 (1992).
184. See S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 279 (1993) (citing testimony from Gen-
eral Colin Powell concerning military "way of life.")
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realize that, had Congress decided to permit homosexuals to serve openly
in the military, several important issues would have arisen. Those issues
fall into the category of military administrative law. As noted above, that
branch of military law is concerned with, among other things, personnel
policies and regulations. 185 Inevitably, there will be arguments that Con-
gress did not go far enough with its current policy, raising several poten-
tial issues. Many of these issues will be briefly addressed.
1. Assignments, promotions, and retention
As a normal incident of making personnel assignments, a ser-
vicemember's qualifications, work performance, and prior assignments
may be routinely relied upon by those responsible for allocating military
resources. 88 Although a servicemember's interests or preferences for a
particular assignment may be considered, it is also well known that they
are really secondary to the needs of the service.8 7 Sometimes the formula
for assignments may be skewed slightly because of other factors; for ex-
ample, married servicemembers are normally not assigned to the same
unit. If Congress had permitted homosexuals to serve openly, personnel
policies on assignments might have been skewed because of a person's
known sexual preference. From a legal standpoint, if a servicemember be-
lieved that he or she was receiving less favorable assignments because of
known sexual preference, 88 it is likely that either administrative or judi-
cial challenges would be made to the administrator's decision.
Similarly, promotion and retention decisions would be challenged.
These decisions are typically made by boards of high ranking officers or
enlisted personnel. Each board receives instructions on the relevant crite-
ria to be applied. For example, if Congress had allowed homosexuals to
serve openly, the question would have arisen whether a board could have
been advised that it could not give any consideration to a person's sexual
preference, status, or orientation. If so, how would those terms be de-
fined? On the other hand, could a board be advised to consider, in order
to create diversity, that sexual preference is a positive factor in deciding
whether to promote or retain an individual?
2. Military benefits
Married servicemembers, and members with dependents, receive a
number of benefits not otherwise available for single members. Perhaps
185. For a discussion of military administrative law as it relates to the composition
and qualifications of servicemembers, see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
186. See Army Regulation 614-100, ch.1, 1-6 (1990) (discussing officer personnel as-
signment system).
187. Id. "The primary factors influencing an officer's assignment are Army require-
ments and the Officer Distribution Plan (ODP). Development of the ODP is based on nu-
merous factors including documented and resourced authorizations, DA [Department of the
Army] priorities, professional development needs and disposition of the force." Id. at 1-6a.
188. For a discussion of issues relating to the application of Bill of Rights provisions to
servicemembers, see supra notes 96-145 and accompanying text.
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the most common examples are housing allowances, medical benefits, and
commissary privileges. However, under the current statute, prohibited ho-
mosexual conduct includes when a "member has married or attempted to
marry a person known to be of the same biological sex." 18" Thus, a homo-
sexual servicemember is clearly not entitled to any military benefits
hinged on a "marriage." The question remains, however, whether military
benefits not contingent on marriage might be available for partners of
homosexual servicemembers. For example, could a homosexual ser-
vicemember be entitled to military benefits, such as commissary privi-
leges, for another homosexual "dependent?"
D. Military Criminal Law Issues
1. Prohibiting conduct, not status: defining conduct
In addition to the administrative law issues discussed above, there
are also a number of criminal law issues which must be addressed. Con-
gress and the Department of Defense have taken the position that homo-
sexual status and conduct are distinguishable and that only the latter is
prohibited.190 With this policy in mind, the following discussion reviews
the current state of military criminal law regarding prosecution of homo-
sexual conduct.
Defining prohibited "conduct" presents drafting problems. Assuming
that homosexual conduct is prohibited, could the military be permitted to
proscribe any physical contact between servicemembers? The statute in-
dicates that "homosexual act" includes "(A) any bodily contact, actively
undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for
the purpose of satisfying sexual desires; and (B) any bodily contact which
a reasonable person would understand to demonstrate a propensity or in-
tent to engage in an act described in subparagraph (A)." 191
At this point, public behavior such as kissing, embracing, and danc-
ing between heterosexual servicemembers is not prohibited except in nar-
rowly defined circumstances.9 2 Should equal protection concerns prohibit
this conduct from all servicemembers? As the cases illustrate, whenever a
commander regulates the personal conduct of servicemembers, he or she
must be prepared to show that the regulation is tailored to meet a partic-
ular military mission or military duty.193 In a regulatory scheme that
flatly prohibits public displays of affection, even well intentioned at-
tempts to regulate such conduct might be considered overbroad and un-
lawful.194 Moreover, assuming that public displays of affection could be
189. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(b)(3) (West Supp. 1994).
190. Id. § 654.
191. Id. § 654(f)(3).
192. See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 42, para. 90, at IV-131 (indecent acts with another).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 22 M.J. 711, 715 (A.C.M.R. 1986). "[A] com-
mander may lawfully regulate all activities which are reasonably necessary to safeguard and
protect the morale, discipline and usefulness of the members of a command and are directly
connected with the maintenance of good order in the service." Id. at 714.
194. For example, a regulation punishing servicemembers for having alcohol in their
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evenly and lawfully regulated, from a practical standpoint, these regula-
tions would be difficult to enforce.
Unanswered questions remain as to whether the armed forces could
lawfully and effectively regulate conduct occurring off-post and after duty
hours. To what extent should the military be able to control the private
conduct of any servicemember? Should different rules be established for
investigating homosexual servicemembers in order to avoid heterosexual
members from being offended?
2. Prohibiting sexual conduct: the future of Article 125
The reported cases indicate that it is rare that a servicemember is
prosecuted solely for consensual homosexual acts. 9 ' Instead, it is more
likely that the servicemember will be administratively discharged.9 8 If
there is evidence of other criminal conduct, such as drug use or assault,
the homosexual acts may be charged along with the other acts.
9 7
The Uniform Code of Military Justice includes several provisions
which might be relied upon to prosecute sexual misconduct. For example,
Article 120 proscribes rape and carnal knowledge'98 and Article 93, pro-
scribing cruelty and maltreatment, may be relied upon to prosecute those
who sexually harass other servicemembers" 9  Additionally, Articles 133200
and 134,201 sometimes referred to as the "general articles, 20 2 may be re-
lied upon to prosecute offenses not otherwise specifically listed in the pu-
nitive articles. For example, those articles are relied upon to prosecute
indecent acts and adultery.
20 3
One provision that will undoubtedly continue to draw attention is
system and on their breath during duty hours was considered void as being arbitrary, unrea-
sonable, and standardless. United States v. Green, 22 M.J. 711 (A.C.M.R. 1986).
195. See generally COLIN J. WILLIAMS, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY 33, 38-53
(1971).
196. Id.
197. Jefrey S. Davis, Military Policy Towards Homosexuals: Scientific, Historical,
and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L. REV. 55, 74 (1991).
198. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (1988).
199. Id. § 893.
200. Article 133 provides: "Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct." Id. § 933.
201. Article 134 provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not
capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken
cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the
nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that
court.
Id. § 934.
202. Richard J. Chema, Arresting "Tailhook": The Prosecution of Sexual Harassment
in the Military, 140 MIL. L. REv. 1, 27 (1993); Kenneth L. Kurst, The Pursuit of Manhood
and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499, 556 (1991).
203. See generally MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, §§ 2-5, -6.
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Article 125, which proscribes sodomy.0 4 On its face, Article 125 is not
limited to homosexual acts. 0 5 In fact, the Court of Military Appeals has
held that Article 125 is constitutional as applied to consensual heterosex-
ual acts.2 0 6 However, Congress could amend Article 125 to accommodate
homosexuals in the armed forces.10 7 Indeed, forceful arguments will be
made that it is an archaic law which does not reflect recent social and
legal trends.
On the other hand, proponents of the Article 125 proscription against
sodomy would probably offer at least two justifications of the statute as
currently enacted. First, given current medical data indicating that homo-
sexual acts present a high risk of transmitting the HIV virus, 08 it would
be reasonable for the military to prohibit that conduct in order to reduce
the risk of transmission and to maintain the health and fitness of its ser-
vicemembers. Second, for many Americans, the prohibition against homo-
sexual acts reflects a moral judgment that such conduct should not be
condoned.2 0 9 Apparently, by leaving Article 125 intact, Congress recog-
nizes that viewpoint.
3. The need to maintain prosecutorial discretion: limiting the deci-
sion to investigate
Notwithstanding any future changes in, or challenges to, substantive
military criminal law, it is important that commanders retain
prosecutorial discretion, since they are in the best position to understand
204. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1988).
205. Article 125 provides:
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copula-
tion with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty
of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense.
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct.
Id.
The maximum punishment for nonconsensual sodomy and for sodomy with a person
under the age of 16 years is a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances,
and confinement for 20 years. MANUAL, supra note 42, at IV-90. In other cases the maximum
punishment is dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances and five years
confinement. MANUAL, supra note 42, at IV-91.
206. United States v. Henderson, 34 M.J. 174 (C.M.A. 1992) (applying Article 125 to
consensual, heterosexual fellatio with ROTC cadet); United States v. Fagg, 34 M.J. 179
(C.M.A. 1992) (applying Article 125 to consensual, private sodomy with civilian junior high
school student).
207. Defining the substantive military law is a matter peculiarly within the prerogative
of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
208. Warren Winkelstein Jr. et al., Sexual Practices and Risk of Infection by Human
Immunodeficiency Virus: The San Francisco Men's Health Study, 237 JAMA 321 (1987);
JEFFREY A. KELLY & JANET S. ST. LAWRENCE, THE AIDS HEALTH CRISIS: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
SOCIAL INTERVENTIONS 21-22 (1988).
209. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-97 (1986) (discussing that majoritarian
sentiments that homosexuality is immoral provides states with adequate constitutional basis
to criminalize sodomy).
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the impact of a particular criminal offense on the unit.2 10 Courts have
typically recognized the broad authority of the commander to investigate
and decide what charges should be preferred against a servicemember.211
Those decisions are not above review, however, and some well-defined
guidelines for bringing charges against a servicemember have developed
over the years.21 2 Although there may be concern that admitting homo-
sexuals into the military will result in higher incidences of prosecution, or
"witch hunts," the solution to this conflict need not focus on abrogating
punitive articles in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Instead, atten-
tion should be directed towards the common sense decisionmaking of
those responsible for maintaining discipline in the military establishment.
A key element in the Department of Defense's new policy is that it
limits investigations of suspected sexual misconduct in a way not found in
other investigations. The Department of Defense guidelines indicate that:
(1) neither investigations nor inquiries will be conducted solely to deter-
mine a servicemember's sexual orientation; (2) commanders may initiate
an investigation where there is "credible information" of sexual miscon-
duct; and (3) generally only commanders, not investigators, may deter-
mine whether sufficient credible information exists to justify the
dedication of investigative resources .2 1 According to the Department of
Defense policy, "credible information" is "[i]nformation, considered in
light of its source and all attendant circumstances, that supports a rea-
sonable belief that a Service member has engaged in sexual misconduct.
Credible information consists of articulable facts, not just a belief or
suspicion. '
In the aggregate, this policy creates a special category of procedural
protections for servicemembers suspected of sexual misconduct which are
not applicable to other persons or conduct. It does so in several key re-
spects. First, it generally limits those who may initiate the investigation.
Second, through the "reasonable belief' component of "credible informa-
tion," it imposes what appears to be a "probable cause" requirement
before an investigation may be commenced.2 1 5 In all other cases, a reason-
able suspicion, tip, and even an investigator's instincts will justify an in-
210. See S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1993) (Senate Armed Services
Committee received assurances from Department of Defense that the policy's guidelines for
investigations would be "implemented in a manner that would provide commanders with
the discretion they need to maintain good order and discipline.").
211. See MILITARY CRIMINAL JUsTicE, supra note 41, § 6-1, at 237 n.15.
212. See id. § 6-1 (discussing process for preferring charges).
213. See Department of Defense Instruction 5505.8 (1994), in Memorandum from Les
Aspin, supra note 9 (Investigations of Sexual Misconduct by the Defense Criminal Investi-
gative Organizations and other DOD Law Enforcement Organizations).
214. Id. at 1-1. See also id. at para. A (allegations of sexual misconduct normally
should be referred to commander; investigative organizations may initiate investigation if
credible information exists that an offense has been committed and it is determined that
expenditure of resources is appropriate).
215. Cf. S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 291 (noting that General Counsel for
Department of Defense had informed Committee that references to "credible information"
and "reasonable belief" did not "involve a legal standard, such as probable cause.").
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vestigation. 216 Further, reasonable suspicion and probable cause are
requirements normally encountered in determining whether governmental
intrusions satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements. 217 Rarely are they
applied in determining whether a military investigation should be
commenced.
In theory, the Department of Defense approach reflects an even-
handed approach to allegations of sexual misconduct, without regard to
the sexual orientation of the accused servicemember. Apparently, in for-
mulating the investigation guidelines, the Department of Defense did not
intend to create any substantive or procedural rights for the accused. 1 8
Nonetheless, to the extent that the application of these rules offers
heightened protections for homosexuals, heterosexual servicemembers can
argue that they are entitled to the same protections. 9 That is, a criminal
investigation into allegations of nonsexual misconduct may not be initi-
ated by anyone other than a commander, and only if there was reasonable
belief to conclude that a crime had been committed.
One additional concern should be noted. The question arises whether
any commander in the chain of command, including the President, could
direct that homosexual conduct not be prosecuted, for example, under
Article 125. The military cases on the issue of command influence might
be helpful on this point. While a commander may withdraw court-martial
jurisdiction over a particular category of offenses, senior commanders are
not permitted to instruct junior commanders how to proceed on a partic-
ular case.22 0 If senior commanders instruct junior commanders to prefer
court-martial charges, they become the "accusers" and under the
U.C.M.J. are thereafter disqualified from acting on the case.
221
216. See MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 5-2, et. seq. (discussing com-
mander's investigation).
217. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (probable cause requirement for searches and seizures
conducted with warrant). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (applying reasonable
suspicion standard to warrantless stop and frisk cases under Fourth Amendment).
218. S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 291 (1993) (quoting testimony of General
Counsel for Department of Defense that application of investigation guidelines was "not
intended to create any substantive or procedural rights to encumber the necessary flexibility
that the military must have in approaching the management of such a large group of
personnel.").
219. It appears that the Department of Defense may have avoided equal protection
complaints from heterosexual servicemembers by dictating an across-the-board limitation
on sexual misconduct. In effect, heterosexual servicemembers benefitted from concerns
about witch hunts being conducted if homosexuals were openly admitted into the military.
220. See e.g., United States v. Shelton, 26 M.J. 787, 792 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988) (general
officer directing subordinate to prefer court-martial charges against the accused was the "ac-
cuser" and thus barred from referring the case to trial); United States v. Corcoran, 17 M.J.
137, 138 (C.M.A. 1984) (senior commander became "accuser" when instructed junior officer
to "write up" defendant, thereby precluding the senior commander from acting as convening
authority in the case and proceeding to trial).
221. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 822(b) (1988). If a command-
ing officer is the accuser, a court-martial "shall" be convened by a superior competent au-
thority. Id.
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4. Jurisdiction issues: regulating off-post conduct
An issue related to regulating homosexual conduct and prosecutorial
discretion is whether, and to what extent, the military should be able to
prosecute servicemembers for conduct occurring off-post. For example,
should the military be able to prosecute a homosexual servicemember for
committing private, consensual sodomy in an off-post location?
The new statute clearly states that the standards of conduct for ser-
vicemembers applies twenty-four hours each day,222 whether the member
is on base or off base, and whether the member is on duty or off duty.22
It is likely that this policy will not settle the debate, especially if those
who oppose any restrictions on homosexual service argue that the military
should allow servicemembers greater zones of privacy.24
In addressing the issue of prosecution of off-duty or off-base conduct,
it is important to note that, from 1969 until 1987, only those offenses
which were service-connected could be prosecuted in military courts. The
genesis for the rule rested in the Supreme Court's opinion in O'Callahan
v. Parker.225 Throughout these years there evolved an elaborate, some-
times confusing, formula for determining whether an offense was service-
connected.226 Finally, in 1987, the Supreme Court concluded in Solorio v.
United States2 7 that court-martial jurisdiction depends entirely on the
status of the defendant as a member of the armed forces. The Court
noted that the Constitution grants Congress plenary authority to deter-
mine the extent of military jurisdiction.
2 28
The reported military cases since 1987 do not reflect a significant in-
crease in the number of off-post cases tried in military courts. In most
instances the military installations have reached formal or informal agree-
ments with local prosecutors as to who will assume jurisdiction over a
particular case.
229
Undoubtedly, some will argue that removing the ban against homo-
sexuals serving in the armed forces would be a hollow step unless they are
assured that what they do in their private lives, off-post, is beyond gov-
ernment control. Those same arguments were made and rejected in a va-
riety of other off-post conduct cases, as well as in the announced policy in
the new statute. 2 0 While it is true that what takes place off-post may not
appear on its face to be of any concern to the military, nevertheless ser-
vice in the armed forces is an around-the-clock proposition. What ser-
222. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(9) (West Supp. 1994).
223. Id. § 654(a)(10).
224. See generally Davis, supra note 197, at 87.
225. 395 U.S. 258, 272 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435
(1987).
226. See MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 4-11.
227. 483 U.S. 435, 451 (1987).
228. Id. at 446.
229. See MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, §§ 4-11 to -12. The Double Jeop-
ardy clause does not apply to different sovereigns; in theory a servicemember could be
charged in both a military and civilian court for the same offense although that is rare.
230. 10 U.S.C.A. § 624(a)(9)-(10) (West Supp. 1994).
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vicemembers do in their free time, off-post, is still subject to the
legitimate needs and the interests of the military.23 1 For example, the mil-
itary has an obvious interest to insure that its members do not use drugs,
either on-post or off-post. At a minimum, what a servicemember does off-
post may be a reflection, positive or negative, on the military itself.
As noted in the earlier discussion, Congress could provide additional
accommodation to homosexuals by codifying some version of the earlier
"service-connection" requirement adopted in O'Callahan.2 32 Such a re-
quirement would mean that court-martial jurisdiction would exist for
conduct occurring in specifically defined circumstances. Examples include
limiting court-martial jurisdiction to conduct while in uniform, between
servicemembers while in duty status, or while on a military installation.
As past experience has demonstrated, service-connection require-
ments raise perhaps more questions than solutions. 33 While a service-
connection requirement might provide some protection for homosexual
activity occurring off-post, there are major concerns about defining appro-
priate limits for any rule which creates immunity from military prosecu-
tion. For example, would the service-connection requirement be extended
only to off-post homosexual acts? Or would it extend to a wider range of
personal contact between homosexuals which do not amount to sexual
acts? In view of potential equal protection issues, would these limits ap-
ply to all private, consensual, off-post sexual conduct of servicemembers?
If a service-connection were to be adopted, what steps could be taken to
avoid the tangled legal questions which the courts struggled with when
the requirement was dictated by judicial opinions? "34 Although this dis-
cussion will not attempt to answer these important questions, in address-
ing these concerns policymakers should remain cognizant of the Supreme
Court's conclusions in Solorio 35
5. Lessons learned from fraternization cases
In the past few years the military has dealt with many fraternization
offenses which may assist the courts in measuring the constitutionality of
Congress' actions. The offense of fraternization is historically based on
the assumption that undue familiarity between officers and enlisted per-
sonnel is potentially fatal to discipline in the unit.236 Thus, over the years,
231. See, e.g., Refre v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 81, 84-85 (1986), aff'd by 883 F.2d
1022 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1011 (1988) (refusing to hear complaint about order
preventing off-duty work); United States v. Reitz, 12 M.J. 784, 785-86 (1982) (holding the
sergeant can be convicted of negligent homicide for off-duty conduct because of special
needs of military).
232. For a discussion of O'Callahan, see supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
233. For a discussion of the service-connection requirement from 1969 to 1987, see
supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
234. For a discussion of the service-connection requirement from 1969 to 1987, see
supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
235. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
236. See generally MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 2-8 (offense of
fraternization).
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military regulations have proscribed such conduct. Typically, the offense
is charged under one of the general articles.
23 7
With the assimilation of women into the military, the incidences of
improper fraternization have increased.23 8 Formerly, the offense of frater-
nization would arise when officers gambled with enlisted personnel, or en-
tered into loan agreements with them.239 Presently, the offense often
arises from intimate sexual relationships between officers and enlisted
personnel, between officers of different ranks, and enlisted personnel of
different ranks.
240
While the underlying sexual acts may not normally be prosecuted,
the offense of fraternization is still relied upon where the two ser-
vicemembers are different in rank, especially where one is in a position of
authority over the other.241 Defining and prosecuting the offense are now
delicate tasks given the view that private, consensual, sexual relationships
implicate liberty interests. 242 Those who criticize the military justice sys-
tem may be quick to condemn the military for prosecuting what can be
viewed as purely private conduct between two individuals who have a
strong attraction for one another.24' Although a number of constitutional
challenges have been made to fraternization prosecutions, to date the
courts have rejected arguments that such prosecutions violate free speech,
equal protection, and privacy rights.
244
The rules governing fraternization will certainly arise where there is
assimilation of homosexuals into the same environment, if one ser-
vicemember is sexually attracted to another servicemember. Unlike the
civilian workplace where individuals work together for a limited portion
of the day, servicemembers' relationships are not necessarily limited to
work-related environments. That is, they do not simply work together.
They work, sleep, eat, and socialize with each other.
The issue of appropriate levels of socialization implicates additional
legal inquiries. For instance, to what extent could the military regulate
social activities such as touching, dancing, and embracing? Assuming the
military accommodates such behavior between heterosexual ser-
vicemembers, could it legitimately prohibit such conduct by homosexuals
without violating equal protection challenges? It is important to note that
237. The general articles are Article 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-34 (1988). For a discussion of the general articles, see supra notes
200-03 and accompanying text.
238. Kevin W. Carter, Fraternization, 113 MIL. L. REv. 61, 81 (1986).
239. Id. at 77. The author noted that "[c]harged officer misconduct with enlisted per-
sonnel unrelated to alcohol included gambling; borrowing money; [and] engaging in homo-
sexual or heterosexual activities." Id. at 78-79 (citations omitted).
240. Id. at 81.
241. MILITARY CmMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 2-8(A).
242. For a discussion of these liberty interests, see supra notes 137-44 and accompany-
ing text.
243. For a discussion of fraternization issues in terms of private conduct, see David S.
Jonas, Fraternization: Time for a Rational Department of Defense Standard, 135 MIL. L.
REv. 37, 37-38 (1992).
244. See MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 41, § 2-8(D).
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the legal implications of regulating intimate associations not only between
heterosexual, but also homosexual, servicemembers were issues Congress
faced in deciding whether to admit homosexuals into the military.245
6. Punishing those who discriminate or harass
While most of the debate has focused on placing limits on homosex-
ual members' sexual activities, there are other military criminal law im-
plications. For example, military criminal law must sanction those who
harass homosexuals or refuse to treat them fairly. Department of Defense
Policy indicates that hostile treatment or violence against a ser-
vicemember, for any reason, will not be tolerated. 46 Article 93 of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice currently prohibits those who are in a
position of command from mistreating and harassing their subordi-
nates.247 Prosecuting a servicemember, not in a position of authority, for
harassing a homosexual would not be possible under Article 93 as it is
currently written.
Perhaps a special code of conduct should be drafted which would ap-
ply to both homosexuals and heterosexuals for sexual behavior in the
armed forces. If that approach has merit, it would only be effective if it
were enforceable through either administrative or criminal sanctions. And
as noted above, to the extent it controlled servicemembers' speech, it
might raise First Amendment issues.24
CONCLUSIONS
The issue of homosexuals in the armed forces presented Congress
with a significant challenge to the exercise of its constitutionally-based
powers to regulate the military. Congress had to draw lines and make
distinctions among a wide range of options. At one end, Congress could
have maintained a strict ban against homosexuals serving in the armed
forces. In the other extreme, Congress could have treated homosexuals as
a protected class, with all of the rights, benefits, and responsibilities
available to heterosexual servicemembers. Between these two positions,
rested a variety of other options, including a policy of limited accommo-
dation - a compromise which does not discriminate on the basis of a
person's status as a homosexual.
In addressing the issue of whether Congress had a rational basis for
its decision to adopt a policy of limited accommodation, the following
points should be considered:
245. Carter, supra note 238, at 74-81 (discussing that both homosexual and heterosex-
ual associations between servicemembers occurred during the period before deliberations
about admitting homosexuals into the military).
246. For a discussion of DOD policy against harassment, see supra note 159 and ac-
companying text.
247. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 893 (1988).
248. For a discussion of these First Amendment issues, see supra notes 105-06, 150-63
and accompanying text.
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(1) The military establishment is a unique organization, constituted
and regulated by Congress. The authority of Congress to determine who
will serve in the armed forces rests in the Constitution.
(2) The purpose of the military establishment is to protect national
security. Any other purpose, or use, is secondary.
(3) "Discipline" is an indispensable ingredient in the military estab-
lishment and activities or issues which divert the commander's or ser-
vicemembers' attention threaten the unit's ability to fulfill its primary
purpose. The persons best able to assess the risks to discipline are the
individuals who must deal with that issue on a daily basis.
(4) Constitutional protections are available to servicemembers, but in
some cases apply in a different or limited fashion. The system of military
law is designed to insure that standards are imposed and, where neces-
sary, enforced through punitive measures. Throughout the system, how-
ever, there are also protections designed to insure fair treatment.
(5) In deciding which course to take in addressing the issue of homo-
sexuals in the armed forces, Congress was faced with potential constitu-
tional, military administrative law, and military criminal law issues.
(6) Many of the statutes, rules, and regulations governing the mili-
tary demonstrate a sensitive balance between individual rights and liber-
ties and governmental interests. The issue of homosexuals serving in the
armed forces presented an opportunity for Congress to decide how to
strike that delicate balance.
(7) Even the middle ground chosen by Congress creates additional
issues of constitutional and military law which must be addressed.
(8) Legal commentators and courts have recognized that, in many in-
stances, the law is based on deeply rooted and firmly held moral values .24
While there may be debate about whether particular sexual acts are
moral or immoral,250 the issue of homosexuality, apart from the myriad
legal issues, implicates potential moral challenges and dilemmas to those
holding such values.2 5' Thus, a key question before Congress was whether
249. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(condemnation of homosexual acts firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical stan-
dards). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 342-43 (1987), in which Justice Brennan,
dissenting, quoted a passage from ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
It is a premise we deduce not merely from the fact of a written constitution but
from the history of the race, and ultimately as a moral judgment of the good
society, that government should serve not only what we conceive from time to
time to be our immediate material needs but also certain enduring values. This
in part is what is meant by government under law.
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24 (1962)
250. Bowers 478 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
251. Cf. S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 305 (1993). Senator Kennedy criticized
the author for noting moral and religious foundations for laws without citing Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), or City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432
(1985), which in his view "provide direct guidance on what the government is expected to do
when faced with significant rejection of a particular class of people by the public, including
situations in which that rejection is based on moral and religious beliefs." Id. What the
Senator failed to note is that neither of those cases dealt with the public's views on homo-
[Vol. 29
MILITARY POLICY
the military, as a paradigm of a "law and order" society, should be re-
quired to accommodate a status or behavior which many servicemembers,
civilians, and potential servicemen would find unacceptable on moral or
religious grounds.252 This is particularly important in light of the military
environment and the competing privacy interests that affect members of
the armed forces.
The route chosen by Congress, a policy of limited accommodation, is
clearly defensible. The statute represents a carefully considered and ar-
ticulated solution to a compelling issue and highly charged arguments.
The extensive Senate Report accompanying the initial Senate version of
the statute is an excellent legislative history of the issues Congress con-
fronted and amply demonstrates that Congress had a rational basis for its
decision. While the "legal Rubik's cube"-the issue of homosexuals in the
military-is not yet fully solved, Congress' careful consideration and ac-
tion has provided a sound basis for concluding that it properly exercised
its Constitutional powers.
APPENDIX
SUBTITLE G - OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 571. POLICY CONCERNING HOMOSExuALITY IN THE ARMED FORCES.
(a) CODIFICATION.-(1) Chapter 37 of title 10, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end of the following new section:
"§ 654. Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces
(a) FINDINGs.-Congress makes the following findings:
"(1) Section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United
States commits exclusively to the Congress the powers to raise
and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces.
"(2) There is no constitutional right to serve in the armed
forces.
"(3) Pursuant to the powers conferred by section 8 of article
I of the Constitution of the United States, it lies within the dis-
cretion of the Congress to establish qualifications for and condi-
tions of service in the armed forces.
"(4) The primary purpose of the armed forces is to prepare
for and to prevail in combat should the need arise.
"(5) The conduct of military operations requires members of
the armed forces to make extraordinary sacrifices, including the
ultimate sacrifice, in order to provide for the common defense.
"(6) Success in combat requires military units that are char-
acterized by high morale, good order and discipline, and unit
sexual acts. Perhaps more significantly, it does not appear that 10 U.S.C.A. § 654 (West
Supp. 1994) is intended to further any particular moral or religious belief; instead, it is
based on the sound view that people who manifest an intent or propensity to engage in
homosexual acts present a risk to the military mission.
252. See, e.g., John P. Elwood, Outing, Privacy, and the First Amendment, 102 YAL.
L.J. 747, 765 (1992) (homosexuality is strongly condemned and penalized in our society).
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cohesion.
"(7) One of the most critical elements in combat capability is
unit cohesion, that is, the bonds of trust among individual service
members that make the combat effectiveness of a military unit
greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness of the individual
unit members.
"(8) Military life is fundamentally different from civilian life
in that-
"(A) the extraordinary responsibilities of the armed
forces, the unique conditions of military service, and the
critical role of unit cohesion, require that the military com-
munity, while subject to civilian control, exist as a special-
ized society; and
"(B) the military society is characterized by its own
laws, rules, customs, and traditions, including numerous re-
strictions on personal behavior, that would not be accept-
able in civilian society.
"(9) The standards of conduct for members of the armed
forces regulate a member's life for 24 hours each day beginning at
the moment the member enters military status and not ending
until that person is discharged or otherwise separated from the
armed forces.
"(10) Those standards of conduct, including the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, apply to a member of the armed forces
at all times that the member has a military status, whether the
member is on base or off base, and whether the member is on
duty or off duty.
"(11) The pervasive application of the standards of conduct
is necessary because members of the armed forces must be ready
at all times for worldwide deployment to a combat environment.
"(12) The worldwide deployment of the United States mili-
tary forces, the international responsibilities of the United States,
and the potential for involvement of the armed forces in actual
combat routinely make it necessary for members of the armed
forces involuntarily to accept living conditions and working con-
ditions that are often spartan, primitive, and characterized by
forced intimacy with little or no privacy.
"(13) The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a long-
standing element of military law that continues to be necessary in
the unique circumstances of military service.
"(14) The armed forces must maintain personnel policies that
exclude persons whose presence in the armed forces would create
an unacceptable risk to the armed forces' high standards of mo-
rale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the es-
sence of military capability.
"(15) The presence in the armed forces of persons who
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts
would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of mo-
rale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the es-
sence of military capability.
"(b) POLIc.-A member of the armed forces shall be separated
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from the armed forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
Defense if one or more of the following findings is made and approved
in accordance with procedures set forth in such regulations:
"(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage
in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts un-
less there are further findings, made and approved in accordance
with procedures set forth in such regulations, that the member
has demonstrated that-
"(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's
usual and customary behavior;
"(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is un-
likely to recur;
"(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of
force, coercion, or intimidation;
"(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the
member's continued presence in the armed forces is consis-
tent with the interests of the armed forces in proper disci-
pline, good order, and morale; and
"(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent
to engage in homosexual acts.
"(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosex-
ual or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further
finding, made and approved in accordance with procedures set
forth in the regulations, that the member has demonstrated that
he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in,
has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual
acts.
"(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a
person known to be of the same biological sex.
"(C) ENTRY STANDARDS AND DOCUlMENTS-(1) The Secretary of De-
fense shall ensure that the standards for enlistment and appointment
of members of the armed forces reflect the policies set forth in subsec-
tion (b).
"(2) The documents used to effectuate the enlistment or appointment
of a person as a member of the armed forces shall set forth the provi-
sions of subsection (b).
"(d) REQUIRED BRIEFINGS.-The briefings that members of the
armed forces receive upon entry into the armed forces and periodically
thereafter under section 937 of this title (article 137 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice) shall include a detailed explanation of the
applicable laws and regulations governing sexual conduct by members
of the armed forces, including the policies prescribed under subsection
(b).
"(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in subsection (b) shall be
construed to require that a member of the armed forces be processed
for separation from the armed forces when a determination is made in
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense
that-
"(1) the member engaged in conduct or made statements for
the purpose of avoiding or terminating military service; and
"(2) separation of the member would not be in the best inter-
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est of the armed forces.
"(f) DEFINITIONS.-In this section:
"(1) The term 'homosexual' means a person, regardless of
sex, who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to
engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts, and includes
the terms 'gay' and 'lesbian.'
"(2) The term 'bisexual' means a person who engages in, at-
tempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to
engage in homosexual and heterosexual acts.
"(3) The term 'homosexual act' means-
"(A) any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively
permitted, between members of the same sex for the pur-
pose of satisfying sexual desires; and
"(B) any bodily contact which a reasonable person would
understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage
in an act described in subparagraph (A)."
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is
amended by adding at the end the following:
"654. POLICY CONCERNING HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE ARMED FORCES".
(b) REGULATIONS.-Not later than 90 days after the date of enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall revise Department of
Defense regulations, and issue such new regulations as may be neces-
sary, to implement section 654 of title 10, United States Code, as added
by subsection (a).
(c) SAVINGS PRoVIsIoN.-Nothing in this section or section 654 of
title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), may be con-
strued to invalidate any inquiry, investigation, administrative action or
proceeding, court-martial, or judicial proceeding conducted before the
effective date of regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense to im-
plement such section 654.
(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress
that-
(1) the suspension of questioning concerning homosexuality
as part of the processing of individuals for accession into
the Armed Forces under the interim policy of January 20,
1993, should be continued, but the Secretary of Defense
may reinstate that questioning with such questions or such
revised questions as he considers appropriate if the Secre-
tary determines that it is necessary to do so in order to ef-
fectuate the policy set forth in section 654 of title 10,
United States Code, as added by subsection (a); and
(2) the Secretary of Defense should consider issuing
guidance governing the circumstances under which mem-
bers of the Armed Forces questioned about homosexuality
for administrative purposes should be afforded warnings
similar to the warnings under section 831(b) of title 10,
United States Code (article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice).
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